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THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: WILL IT
SNEAK UP ON THE U.S.?

I. INTRODUCTION

G

(“GHG”) emissions from human activities have been increasing exponentially since the beginning of the industrial revolution. Scientists believe that
human industries like energy production, transport, mining,
rice cultivation, and other activities that emit GHGs are fundamentally changing the way energy from the sun interacts
with and escapes from our planet's atmo sphere.1 The result is
increasing average temperatures on the earth’s surface and
shifts in worldwide weather patterns, collectively known as
global warming.2 How these climatic changes will affect our
way of life is not entirely clear.3 Some scientists have posited
that altering wind and rainfall patterns could lead to widespread food shortages, and rising sea levels may threaten islands and low-lying coastal areas.4 Although the impact is not
entirely understood, it is fairly clear that large volumes of
GHGs are being poured into the earth’s atmosphere at an
alarming rate and that there will most certainly be repercussions.5
REENHOUSE GAS

1. See Conference of Parties 5 (“COP 5”), Understanding Climate Change:
A Beginner’s Guide to the U.N. Framework Convention and its Kyoto Protocol
at http://cop5.unfccc.de/convkp/begconkp.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2001)
[hereinafter COP5 Website].
2. Id.
3. Residents of some areas of Central Europe might take sharp exception
to this statement. In the summer of 2002, Central Europe saw torrential
rains and flooding of a historic scale that caused several deaths and massive
damage to areas surrounding rivers such as the Danube and the Elbe — all of
which were arguably the result of global warming. See Many Germans Believe
Bush to Blame for European Floods, DEUTSCHE P RESSE -AGENTUR, Aug. 14,
2002, LEXIS, News & Business, News, By Individual Publication, D, Deutsche
Presse-Agentur, available at http://www.climateark.org/articles/reader.asp?
linkid=14352.
4. COP5 Website, supra note 1.
5. See Miguel Llanos, A Consensus Emerges Around Global Warming,
MSNBC, at http://www.msnbc.com/news/106332.asp (Jan. 10, 1999).
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In response to this reality, the United Nations (“U.N.”) created the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (“Convention”) in 1992, whose goal is the “stabilization
of [GHG] concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system.”6 In attempting to realize this goal, the Convention
drafted the Kyoto Protocol (“Protocol”) in 1997, which sets international limitations on GHG emissions and establishes a
global marketplace for the trading of GHGs including carbon
dioxide (“CO 2”), methane (“CH 4”), nitrous oxide (“N2O”), hydrofluorocarbons (“HFCs”), perfluorocarbons (“PFCs”), and sulphur
hexafluoride (“SF6”).7 The Protocol limits the amount of GHGs
that states party to the Protocol (“Contracting Parties”) may
produce, based on a percentage of their 1990 GHG production
levels. The result is that the Contracting Parties, under the
Protocol, own the rights to produce a certain number of units8 of
GHGs.9 In turn, each state may allocate or auction its units to
the GHG producing sectors of its economy according to the goals
of the Protocol.10 If the Contracting Parties desire to produce
more pollution than they are allocated, they have several options such as purchasing additional units from other states11 or
creating units by funding “sinks,” which are projects, like reforestation projects, that remove greenhouse gases from the at6. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, March 21, 1994, art.
II, S. T REATY DOC. NO. 102–38, 31 I.L.M. 849 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
7. Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 10, 1997, Annex A, U .N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22
[hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
8. The term “unit” is being used here somewhat carelessly. Under the
Marrakesh Accords (explained further below), there are several types of
“units” whose nomenclature is based on the function the measure is being
used to quantify. Specifically, in this context the appropriate term is “assigned amount unit” or “AAU,” which is equal to one metric ton of CO2 or CO2
equivalent. However, since each type of unit is equal to one metric ton of CO2
equivalent, the term “unit” is used to refer to one metric ton of CO2 equivalent.
Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventh Session, Held at Marrakesh, 29 October to 10 November 2001, Seventh Conference of Parties, Part
Two, Vol. II, Decision 19/CP.7, Draft decision -/CMP.1, Annex I.A., ¶ 3, at 57,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (2002) [hereinafter Marrakesh Accords –
Vol. II].
9. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, at art. 3.
10. Id. at art. 2.
11. Id. at art. 3 ¶¶ 10–13 (providing for the transferability of GHG units).
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mosphere.12 In essence, the Protocol turns certain polluting
gases into commodities, like pork bellies or gold. In turn this
allows market forces to operate on GHG emissions and allocate
its production according to best use, while at the same time rewarding those states and entities that employ clean technology
and best reduce GHG production.13
Despite its earlier endorsement, the United States (“U.S.”),
under the Bush Administration, declined to ratify the Protocol.14 Although the U.S. has withdrawn its support, large
American, multinational, GHG-producing corporations may still
feel the effects of the Protocol.15 This Note will argue that widespread implementation of the Protocol outside the U.S. will
nonetheless lead to a reduction in domestic U.S. GHG production — due to factors such as the forces of globalization, the
recognition by U.S. lawmakers of their country’s role in combating GHG production, the increased presence of American affiliates abroad, the increasing international pressure on the U.S.,
and the global nature of GHGs. Part II outlines the structure
and assumptions behind the Protocol and the accords that will
be used to implement it. This Part provides the foundational
background required to analyze the U.S. refusal to ratify the
Protocol and demonstrates that the Protocol contains mechanisms that will have the effect of reducing domestic U.S. GHG
production. Part III lays out the underlying rationale for and
against U.S. implementation of the Protocol and demonstrates
that despite President Bush’s stance on the Protocol, both the
international community and U.S. lawmakers are dedicated to
combating global warming. It then posits that because of this
12. Id. at art. 3, ¶ 3 (allowing states to use afforestation and reforestation
projects to meet GHG commitments).
13. See Rana Foroohar, The New Green Game: Tradable allowances for
greenhouse gases may one day become the world’s biggest commodities market,
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 2001, at 62, available at http://www.climateark.org/
articles/2001/3rd/newgrgam.htm.
14. See Letter to Members of the Senate on the Kyoto Protocol on Climate
Change, 37 WEEKLY COMP . P RES. D OC . 444 (Mar. 19, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010314.html (Letter of
March 13, 2001 detailing President Bush’s reasons for rejecting the Protocol)
[hereinafter Letter from the President].
15. It appears that the Protocol will become effective without U.S. Participation.
Agreement
reached
on
climate
talks,
MSNBC,
at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/649465.asp?0cb=21337412 (last visited Nov. 10,
2001) [hereinafter Climate Talks].
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multilateral commitment, the U.S. will not take measures to
prevent any positive impact international implementation of
the Protocol may have on the U.S. Part IV analyzes the phenomenon of globalization and the expansion of U.S. industry
abroad. It demonstrates that due to these global forces and the
nature of GHGs, the Protocol will have a positive effect on domestic production of GHGs despite the refusal of the U.S. to
ratify.
Part V concludes by noting that although the
international community may be able to reduce domestic emi ssions in the U.S. without direct U.S. participation in the Protocol, there is still hope to bring the U.S. into international
schemes to reduce GHGs.
II. STRUCTURE AND GOALS OF THE PROTOCOL
The underlying logic of the Protocol is based on two main assumptions. First, global warming is a global problem that is
most effectively combated through a solution of equally global
scale. Second, market mechanisms are the best and most cost
effective means of allocating and reducing GHG production.
These assumptions form the basis of the Protocol and thus permeate the mechanisms and structure of the Protocol itself.
A. Global Warming is a Global Problem
Global warming is not an issue that can be handled unilaterally by any single state, regardless of its size or might. “The
undeniable fact is that climate change is a global problem that
requires a global solution.”16 This truth has been reiterated
multiple times even by those who oppose implementation of the
Protocol. In the U.S. Senate, debate over the Protocol has led
both to impassioned pleas and a quiet resolve that eventually
the U.S. must work with the international community to develop solutions to the GHG problem — especially in light of the
fact that the U.S. produces approximately 25% of the world’s
GHG emissions.17 There seems to be some general consensus
16. Frank E. Loy, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, Remarks at
the Earth Technologies Forum for the International Climate Change Partnership (Oct. 30, 2000), at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/climate/
00110203.htm, reprinted in Frank E. Loy, The United States Policy on the
Kyoto Protocol and Climate Change, 15 N AT. RESOURCES & ENV ’T 152 (2001).
17. 147 CONG. REC. S8894 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2001) (statement of Sen.
McCain). See infra Part III for further information on the U.S. perspective.
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among U.S. lawmakers that the largest contributor to global
warming must take responsibility for its share of the problem.18
The debate has continued even after U.S. refusal to commit to
the Protocol. For example, Senator Lieberman has expressed
that he is “extremely troubled by the failure of our government
to engage on this crucial issue [in Kyoto]…I believe this failure
abdicates the United States’ position as a leader in environmental affairs and places U.S. industry at risk.”19 Ironically,
despite his public opposition to the Protocol, even President
Bush has tacitly echoed Senator Lieberman’s sentiments.
“Even with the best science, even with the best technology, we
all know the United States cannot solve this global problem
alone .”20 These recognitions are indicative of the enormity of
the problem and the global reach required by any solution proposed to solve it.
Further evidence of the broad support for a global solution is
presented by the sheer number of states that are signatories to
the Protocol that was once described as “the most complex,
broad ranging and ambitious environmental agreement ever
negotiated by the international community.”21 As of September
25, 2002, eighty-four states, including the U.S., had signed the
Protocol, demonstrating a willingness to organize a global re-

See also Loy, supra note 16. The 25% figure used by Senator McCain is
slightly inflated. According to the revised estimates in the Marrakesh Accords, the U.S. produces about 21% of the world’s total GHG emissions. Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventh Session, Held at Marrakesh, 29 October to 10 November 2001, Seventh Conference of Parties, Part
Two, Vol. IV , Decision 38/CP.7, Annex, at 33–37, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.4 (2002) (Indicative scales of contribution 2002–2003)
[hereinafter Marrakesh Accords – Vol. IV ].
18. Sen. James Jeffords, Carbon dioxide output rose in 2000, MSNBC,
available at http://www.msnbc.com/news/655467.asp (last visited Nov. 9,
2001) [hereinafter CO2 Output Rose].
19. 147 CONG. REC. S8894–95 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Lieberman).
20. Remarks on Global Climate Change, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC .
876–879 (June 18, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2001/06/20010611-2.html (President’s speech in the Rose Garden on
June 11, 2001) [hereinafter President Bush Discusses Global Climate
Change].
21. Loy, supra note 16.
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sponse to GHG emissions.22 In addition, ninety-five states have
actually ratified or acceded to the Protocol, signifying the international consensus on the need for a global r esponse.23
B. Solution: Global Market Mechanisms
The Protocol is designed to create a global answer to the
global warming problem, and is endowed with the necessary
provisions for the establishment of an international GHG trading system.24 However, before one can analyze the Protocol itself, it is important to discuss further the foundational premises
of the Protocol. The first premise, as discussed above, is the
notion that a global problem demands a global solution.25 The
second premise is that a market system is the most cost effective means of reducing overall GHG emissions, especially in
comparison to traditional command-and-control methods.26 It is
this second premise that this section addresses.
1. An Argument for Market Mechanisms
The traditional command-and-control model, in the environmental sense, refers to regulations that require entities to adopt
certain procedures and technologies in order to meet their reduction standards set by the government.27 These regulations
generally do not distinguish between industry participants.
These regulations generally dictate both performance and technology standards, which has the distinct advantage of facilitating monitoring and enforcement.28 However, its strength in creating bright line rules also produces its greatest weakness in
22. UNFCCC Website, The Convention and Kyoto Protocol, at
http://unfccc.int/resource/convkp.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2002). Note that the
U.S. is a signatory to the Protocol but has not ratified it.
23. Id.
24. See Press Release, United Nations, Governments Adopt Bonn Agreement on Kyoto Protocol Rules, ENV/DEV/594 (July 23, 2001), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/envdev594.doc.htm.
25. See supra Part II.A.
26. Jennifer Yelin-Kefer, Warming up to an International Greenhouse Gas
Market: Lessons from the U.S. Acid Rain Experience, 20 S TAN . ENVTL. L.J.
221, 224 (2001).
27. David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy,
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV . 289, 296 (1998).
28. Yelin-Kefer, supra note 26, at 221, 226.
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not allowing industry the flexibility required to find more optimal solutions.29
Command-and-control regulations do not take into account
the nuances between individual players and industries.30 For
example, suppose Company A and Company B are subject to
command -and control regulation that requires both comp anies
to reduce their emission levels of pollutant X to 100 units or less
per year. This regulation has the obvious advantage of creating
a bright line rule.31 If A or B’s emissions levels are over 100
units, then they are in violation of the law. However, suppose
that A has the ability to develop new technology that would allow it to operate at the same output level while only producing
90 units of X per year. Suppose further that if A does not develop the cleaner technology, its X production would remain at
100 units per year. B, on the other hand, is not able to develop
technology or meet its goal, and it produces 110 units. In order
to remain within the confines of the regulation, B must cut its
output levels by a sufficient amount to reduce its X production
levels to 100 units. If X production directly correlates with output then B would have to reduce output by 10 units in order to
comply with the command-and-control regulation. In this case,
A had no financial incentive to invest in the development of
new, cleaner technology as it was already within the limits of
the regulation and would not have received a return on its
investment in the development of these technologies, whereas B
was forced to cut output in order to be within the confines of the
law.32 Here, the economic costs of the environmental regulations are prohibitive and cause an undue burden on B.
In comparison, market mechanisms, by merely setting an
overall limit and creating economic incentives, would alleviate
the problem described above.33 First, the parties would not be
29. Id.
30. See Driesen, supra note 27, at 289; David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or
Cheap Fix?: The Emissions Trading Idea and the Climate Change Convention,
26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV . 1 (1998).
31. Id.
32. Yelin-Kefer, supra note 26, at 226. B does have incentive to develop
cleaner technologies but may not be in a position to commit to research and
development because of capital requirements, return on investments, etc.
33. Id. Sale of cleaner technology is an option in the command-and-control
context, but without incentives for development of these technologies, the
option has less impact.
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forced to remain within the individual confines of a command
regulation. The companies would be free to trade units, and sell
and license clean technology in order to both make a profit and
lower the overall levels of polluting units produced.34 Second,
market regulation would allow parties to make a more accurate
cost-benefit analysis of its activities.35 Market mechanisms
turn the regulated polluting unit into commodities that can be
priced exactly by the market.36 This has the dual benefit of allowing parties to more accurately assess the importance of its
polluting activities and in turn leads parties to develop
technology that is cleaner and cuts costs.37 Moreover, some parties may be able to actually create a source of revenue by selling
its excess units on the open market.38 Finally, the government
will also benefit by using market mechanisms to create new
revenue streams.39 The government could allocate units of pollutants through an auction system, much like the Federal
Communication Commission (“FCC”) auctions, whereby entities
would pay to pollute. In this way, regulators enable the market
to find the most cost effective means of implementing its law
without going through the costly and time -consuming process of
legislative determination.40 In addition, it placates industry,
especially in the U.S., which has repeatedly said that if Government sets the rules, they will take them from there and
make a GHG trading system work.41
Returning to the above example, assume that the regulators
chose a system that implemented market mechanisms where
polluting units are transferable and the government has set the
overall level of X emissions at 200 units, and Companies A and
B receive 100 units each through public auction. In this case, A
has a financial incentive to invest in the development of clean
technologies because for every unit A is under the 100 unit
mark, it creates a commodity that can be then sold on the market to another producer like B who requires the additional
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Foroohar, supra note 13.
37. Id.
38. Yelin-Kefer, supra note 26, at 226.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 147 CONG. REC. S8894 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2001) (statement of Sen.
McCain).
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units.42 Thus, by developing and implementing cleaner technologies, A has created for itself a surplus of 10 additional
units, which it can then sell or trade to B. In this way, overall
output remains the same and yet production of X has been reduced.
Under a system of regulation using market mechanisms, like
the system proposed by the Protocol, the parties in this hypothetical would have additional options. One option is that A
could sell or license its clean technology to B, which would allow
A to keep the additional units of X saved as well as generate a
stream of income from licensing its technology. Another option
is that B could try to reduce its X production by reducing units
of X produced in other areas. For example, B could fund a project that reduces X production in another sector or area of the
world. If this project reduces X production by 10 units, then B
is within its allotment. This would be an especially attractive
option for B if the costs of funding the project were significantly
less than purchasing units from A or licensing A’s technology.
Regardless of which option A and B ultimately opt for, the
point is that these entities have not been forced to reduce their
production of X in any particular way. They have been given
the flexibility to analyze for themselves, relative to their own
individual circumstances, the best and most cost effective
means for reducing production of X. Thus, the market mechanism scheme creates a greater equilibrium and allows for the
best use of the pollutant, while reducing the overall level of pollutant emitted.43
2. Market Mechanism as a Means of Oppression
Despite these pro-market mechanisms arguments, they are
not without their critics, especially as applied to the Protocol.44
These objections generally come in the form of equity arguments. One argument begins with the premise that the industrialized world has a long history of economic expansion at the
expense of underdeveloped nations – exploiting their peoples
42. In addition, this commodity would be renewable and once established,
creates a relatively cost-free stream of revenue.
43. For a more thorough discussion of the pros and cons of market mechanisms see generally Driesen, supra note 27.
44. See, e.g., Yelin-Kefer, supra note 26, at 231–233 (summarizing arguments against the mechanisms used in the Protocol).
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and natural resources. Implementing a trading system that
relies on market mechanisms would simply allow industrialized
states to continue their disproportionate growth at the expense
of underdeveloped nations by financially coercing them into forgoing development in exchange for payments for pollution credits.45 Allowing financial powerhouses to simply purchase credits would, in effect, perpetuate these states’ supremacy and
permit them to sidestep their responsibility to reduce domestic
emissions.46
Similarly, some argue that market mechanism systems that
allow wealthy nations to gain pollution credits by supporting
developing countries’ clean air projects and development of carbon “sinks” serve as a disincentive to industrialized countries to
develop new technologies and promote reductions in domestic
emissions.47 This theory is based on the idea that less deve loped states are “low hanging fruit” or “free lunch” for industrial
nations since it is easier to fund a reforestation project or power
plant conversion than make the risky, and possibly “fruitless,”
investment in technological development.48 In this manner,
“sinks” become a vessel for technological stagnancy and inhibit
progress.49
Although these arguments examine some of the inequities
that may arise in the relationship between market mechanisms
and environmental regulation, they do not attack the basic assumption that market mechanisms are a cost effective means of
reducing overall levels of pollutants. However, these arguments do present serious questions as to the social responsibility of implementing such mechanisms. For this reason, the
framers of the Protocol had precisely these concerns in mind
when drafting the document. The Protocol attempts to limit the
negative repercussions, as discussed above.50 For example, it
does not place limits on developing states, only industrialized
nations, thereby relieving developing states of the burden of
45. Id.
46. Yelin-Kefer, supra note 26, at 232.
47. Driesen, supra note 30, at 18–35. “Sinks” are things that sequester
carbon from the atmosphere. See infra Part II.C.1.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. The terms of the Protocol and discussion of particular issues regarding
the Protocol will be discussed more thoroughly. See infra Part III.C.
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deciding whether to forgo long-term growth in exchange for
temporary gain.51 The Protocol also puts limits on the number
of units that may be acquired through the funding and development of clean air projects and sinks internationally.52 This
encourages the initiation of projects within the boarders of foreign states, probably undeveloped states not party to the Protocol, but yet limits the impact of the “low hanging fruit” problem.
Suffice it to say, market mechanisms, although not perfect, are
a desirable means of reaching the ultimate goal of worldwide
GHG emission reductions.
C. The Nuts and Bolts of the Kyoto Protocol
The Protocol of 1997 merely set up a framework within which
the work of the Convention was to be accomplished in subsequent conferences. As usual, the devil was in the details and it
took the Contracting Parties several conferences to come to an
agreement as to the specifics with which this new system is to
function. At the sixth meeting of the Convention of Parties
(“COP 6”),53 held in Bonn, Germany, the 180 states involved
struck an Eleventh hour political compromise that saved the
Protocol.54 The next conference, COP 7, held in Marrakesh, Morocco, was not a negotiating session, but rather a codification of
the political agreement reached in Bonn. The accords that resulted from COP 7 in Marrakesh (“Accords”)55 represent the
labors of the Bonn conference and provide a detailed rulebook
for the implementation of the Protocol.

51. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, at Annex B (listing the Contracting states). This topic was a major point of contention at the Protocol Convention
and was ultimately one of the issues that led to the U.S. decision not to ratify
the Protocol. See infra Part III.B.1.
52. See infra Part II.C.2.
53. Individual conventions of the Conference of Parties are referred to as
“COP,” followed by a number designating which convention in the chronology
is being referred (for example “COP 3” is the third conference). These conferences are designed for the purpose of creating mechanisms to implement the
provisions of the Protocol.
54. Climate
talks
resume,
CNN,
at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/10/28/morocco.climate/index.html
(Oct. 29, 2001).
55. Id.
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1. Allocation
Each Contracting Party is allocated a specific number of assigned amount units (“AAUs”).56 The number of AAUs allocated
to a state represents the number of metric tons of CO 2 equivalent that the state may produce for a given period. The final
tally of AAUs allocated is derived from a reduced percentage 57
of each state’s 1990 aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide
equivalent emissions of GHGs, multiplied by five.58 In addition,
the Protocol provides that additional units may be earned based
on land-use change and forestry, which remove GHGs from the
atmosphere.59
Each Contracting Party is required to facilitate the calculation of its assignment amount, by submitting a two-part report.60 The first part requires the Contracting Parties to submit
a complete inventory of GHG emissions and removals from the
base year of 1990 to the most current date available, concluding
with a calculation of its assigned amount on the basis of this
inventory.61 The second part requires the states to calculate its
“commitment period reserve,” which includes identification of
its “election activities,” and their associated land areas, as well
as a description of the national registry and recording systems –
aiding in the allocation calculations and verifying national
monitoring systems.62 In this manner, the Protocol and the Accords attempt to set up a system of disclosure designed to fairly
allocate AAUs.
2. Emission Reduction Unit Me chanisms
The Protocol and the Accords allow the Contracting Parties to
reduce GHG emission requirements based on the state’s use of

56. Each AAU is equal to one metric ton of carbon dioxide or its equivalent.
Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II, supra note 8, at 57.
57. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, at Annex B (indicating percentage reductions for each Contracting Party).
58. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, art. 3 ¶ 7.
59. Id. This notion will be discussed more thoroughly in the next section.
See infra Part II.C.2.
60. Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II (Decision 19/CP.7, Draft decision -/CMP.1,
Annex I.B., ¶ 6), supra note 8, at 58.
61. Id. ¶ 7, at 58.
62. Id. ¶ 8, at 58–59.
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“sinks,”63 clean development mechanisms (“CDMs”)64, and
through the trading of emission units.65 These activities66 create emission reduction units (“ERUs”), which, once verified by
supervisory committees,67 may be used toward fulfilling a Contracting Party’s GHG emissions reduction commitments.68
Thus, if a state funds a reforestation project69 that removes ten
units of GHG emissions from the atmosphere, then that state
would receive an additional ten ERUs, giving the state the right
to produce ten units of GHGs. All CDM project activity occurring as of the year 2000 is eligible for validation so long as it is
submitted to the commission for registration before December
31, 2005. 70 A state’s eligibility to participate in these mechanisms is contingent on its compliance with methodological and
reporting requirements,71 providing an incentive for the Contracting Parties to comply with the Protocol’s compliance procedures.

63. Sinks are defined as removals of GHGs resulting from “direct humaninduced land-use change and forestry activities.” Kyoto Protocol, supra note
7, at art. 3, ¶ 3.
64. CDMs are projects conducted by Annex I, participating, industrialized
states, occurring in states that are not included under Annex I. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, at art. 12. The theory is that global warming is an international problem, and it makes no difference where the emissions occur. Under
this line of reasoning, a reduction in emissions in another state is equally as
beneficial as a reduction within the boarders of the Contracting Party, and
should count toward the Contracting Party’s overall reduction requirement.
65. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, at art. 17; Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II
(Decision 18/CP.7), supra note 8, at 50–54.
66. This is excluding the trading of units, which does not create new units
but rather transfers ownership of previously existing units.
67. Supervisory committees are set up under the Accords to verify ERUs
that come from each of the mechanisms allowed for under Articles 6, 12, and
17 of the Protocol. See e.g., Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II (Decision 16/CP.7,
Draft decision -/CMP.1, ¶ 3), supra note 8, at 6 (Article 6 committee).
68. Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II (Decision 15/CP.7, Draft decision -/CMP.1,
¶ 6), supra note 8, at 4.
69. This could mean that these projects are funded by either state governments or through private entities.
70. Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II (Decision 17/CP.7, ¶ 13), supra note 8, at
23.
71. Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II (Decision 15/CP.7, Draft decision -/CMP.1,
¶ 5), supra note 8, at 4; see Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, arts. 5, 7 (detailing
requirements for measurement methodologies, and information communication).
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The enforcement branch of the Compliance Committee is responsible for oversight of ERU/CDM mechanisms,72 which are
scheduled to be reviewed no later than one year after the end of
the first commitment period.73 The review will be based on the
recommendations of the Articles 6, 12, and 17 supervisory
committees and by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation,
drawing on technical advice from the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice.74 These supervisory bodies ensure that both the reporting and scientific underpinnings of
unit allocation and ERU credits are and continue to be consistent with reality. These bodies will act not only as auditors but
also as policy makers and review the impact of policy choices
made in the framing of the Protocol and subsequent accords.
For example, under the Accords, the Conference made the policy decision that Article 12 afforestation and reforestation project activities (“sinks”) may only account for a maximum of 1%
of base year emissions times five that a Party may use towards
its first commitment period goals.75 The supervisory bodies will
analyze whether provisions like this are serving their intended
functions. In this manner the Protocol and its accords provide
for a continuing review of the effectiveness of both its scientific
and political assumptions.
3. Monitoring
Monitoring will be conducted through both national and international monitoring groups, which will not only monitor
emissions but also monitor the impact of GHGs on the climate.
These groups will accomplish their goals by collecting data such
as climate and hydroclimate studies, geographical information
72. Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II (Decision 15/CP.7, Draft decision -/CMP.1,
¶ 5), supra note 8, at 4.
73. The first commitment period lasts from 2008–2012. Kyoto Protocol,
supra note 7, at art. 3 ¶ 1.
74. Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II (Decision 16/CP.7, Draft decision -/CMP.1,
¶ 8), supra note 8, at 6–7 (Article 6); Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II (Decision
17/CP.7, Draft decision -/CMP.1, ¶ 4), supra note 8, at 24 (Article 12); Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II (Decision 18/CP.7, ¶ 2), supra note 8, at 50 (Article
17).
75. Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II (Decision 17/CP.7, ¶ 7(b)), supra note 8, at
22. This provision addresses the concern that states will be able to shirk their
responsibility to reduce domestic emissions by simply going after the “low
hanging fruit.” See infra Part II.B.
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systems, sea-level rise, fire hazards, and land degradation statistics.76 The Protocol requires that each state have in place, no
later than one year prior to the start of the first commitment
period a national system for the estimation of anthropogenic
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all GHGs.77 The
national monitoring systems are required to send information
regarding their GHG registries to the secretariat in “a standard
electronic format,” that will account for the total numbers of
ERUs, CERs, AAUs, and RMUs.78 “Expert review teams” will
then sort through the information and ascertain whether the
state’s national system has complied with the reporting guidelines and cross-check the information on transfers and acquisitions of units.79 The committee will also conduct “in-country
review” of national registries to ensure compliance with the
provisions of the Accords.80
4. Enforcement
The Compliance Committee will function as a plenary of two
branches – the facilitative branch and the enforcement
branch.81 The enforcement branch, as the name would indicate,
determines whether a Contracting Party included in Annex I is
not in compliance with any of the requirements of the Protocol
or the Accords, and determines the consequences for non76. Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventh Session, Held at
Marrakesh, 29 October to 10 November 2001, Seventh Conference of Parties,
Part Two, Vol. I, Decision 5/CP.7, ¶ 7, at 34, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (2002).
77. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, at art. 5 ¶ 1.
78. Emission Reduction Unit (“ERU”), Certified Emission Reduction
(“CER”), Assigned Amount Unit (“AAU”), Removal Unit (“RMU”). Marrakesh
Accords – Vol. II (Decision 19/CP.7, Draft decision -/CMP.1, Annex III.A., ¶
49), supra note 8, at 68.
79. Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventh Session, Held at
Marrakesh, 29 October to 10 November 2001, Seventh Conference of Parties,
Part Two, Vol. III, Decision 23/CP.7, Appendix 1, ¶ 5, at 32–33, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3 (2002) [hereinafter Marrakesh Accords – Vol. III].
80. Marrakesh Accords – Vol. III (Decision 23/CP.7, Appendix 1, ¶ 10),
supra note 79, at 34.
81. Marrakesh Accords – Vol. III (Decision 24/CP.7, Annex II., ¶ 2), supra
note 79, at 65. The “plenary” aspect of the Compliance Committee is a bureau
made up of members of the two branches, which, among other things, reports
the activities of the Compliance Committee at COPs. See, Marrakesh Accords
– Vol. III (Decision 24/CP.7, Annex III.), supra note 79, at 66–67.
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compliance.82 The consequences are either to adjust the noncomplying Party’s inventories under Article 5 of the Protocol, or
make a correction to the compilation and accounting database
for the accounting of AAVs under Article 7.83 In either event,
the rebuke of a non-complying Party is based on punitively altering their target goals. In addition, the provisions of the Protocol will also be enforced through controlling access to GHG
trading. An Annex I Party84 is eligible to transfer and/or acquire (trade) ERUs, CERs, AAUs, or RMUs85 if it is a Party to
the Protocol, has followed the prescribed monitoring procedures,
has a national system for the estimation of anthropogenic emi ssions, and has made the prescribed transfer of information according to the Protocol and the Accords.86 Thus, if a Contracting Party is not in compliance with the Protocol, then the
enforcement and/or facilitative branch may prevent the state
from participating in the trading scheme under the Protocol.
D. The Protocol — Ready for Action
The Protocol will not take affect until at least fifty-five Contracting Parties, representing at least 55% of the world’s GHG
emissions, have ratified the Protocol.87 Since the U.S. has already made clear that it will not support the Protocol and seeing that the U.S. produces 21% of the world’s GHGs, for the
Protocol to take affect, there must be virtual unanimity among
all remaining industrialized nations.88 However, it appears that
82. Marrakesh Accords – Vol. III (Decision 24/CP.7, Annex V.), supra note
79, at 68–69.
83. Id.
84. Annex I refers to industrialized states that have signed the Protocol
and have been allocated a commitment level under Annex B of the Protocol.
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, Annex B.
85. Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II (Decision 19/CP.7, Draft decision -/CMP.1,
Annex I.A.), supra note 8, at 57.
86. Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II (Decision 18/CP.7, Draft decision -/CMP.1,
Annex, ¶ 2), supra note 8, at 52–53. Lists of eligible trading parties are to be
publicly accessible and maintained by the secretariat. Marrakesh Accords –
Vol. II (Decision 18/CP.7, Draft decision -/CMP.1, Annex, ¶ 4), supra note 8, at
53.
87. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, at art. 25 ¶ 1.
88. The Marrakesh Accords list 187 states and their estimated respective
contributions to the world’s production of GHGs — totaling 100%. Of the 187
states listed, the top 30 producing states produce approximately 90% of the
world’s GHG emissions with the top 4 producers emitting about 55%. This
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the requisite consensus has formed around the Protocol. As of
October 16, 2002, ninety-six Contracting Parties have ratified
the Protocol, representing 37.4% of the world’s GHG emissions.89 With the numerical requirement for effectiveness already fulfilled, the Protocol will become effective if states representing an additional 17.6% of the world’s GHG emissions
commit to ratification. Many commentators believe this will in
fact occur within the next year .90 In any event, it is clear that
the Protocol will most likely come into effect, and that this surprising unanimity of purpose is the result of dedicated negotiation and compromise.
Umbrella states91 like Russia, Japan, and Canada were at
first reluctant to ratify the Protocol without U.S. involvement.
However, last minute concessions by the states in the European
Union (“EU”) have opened the way to widespread ratification by
governments.92 The Japanese government has recently ratified
the Protocol, which at the time brought the total number of ratifying nations to seventy-three, representing 36% of the world’s
total GHGs emissions.93 Although Japan had previously stated
means that if the top 4 producers — U.S., Japan, Germany, and France —
were to ratify the Protocol, the percentage requirement for effectiveness would
be met. However, without U.S. support, the Protocol would require ratification from the top 11 producers of GHGs. If Japan, which produces 19% of the
world’s GHG emissions, were to take back its ratification, the Protocol would
require ratification from more than 40 of the next top producers. Marrakesh
Accords – Vol. IV , supra note 17.
89. COP 8 Website, Kyoto Protocol Thermometer at http://unfccc.int/
resource/kpthermo_if.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2002) (providing chart showing ratification progress).
90. See Russia close to Kyoto signing, CNN, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/
WORLD/africa/09/03/kyoto.russia.glb/index.html (Sept. 3, 2002).
91. At the COP meetings, a partnership of states called the “Umbrella
Group,” including Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, Russia, and the United
States, had a foundation of similar views relating to the Protocol. Press Release, Union of Concerned Scientists, Flexibility and Credibility: The Keys to
the Kyoto Protocol, at http://www.ucsusa.org/releases/flex.html (last visited
Oct. 5, 2002).
92. Press Release, U.N. FCCC, Governments ready to ratify Kyoto Protocol
(Nov. 10, 2001), available at http://unfccc.int/press/prel2001/pressrel101101.
pdf.
93. Section 1.01 Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs

(DEFRA), United Kingdom, Kyoto Protocol: Japan ratifies, Australia
rejects, at http://www.defra.gov.uk/news/latest/2002/japanoz.htm (last
visited Oct. 5, 2002) (Japan ratified the Protocol on June 5, 2002).
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that the main hurdle to ratification was participation by the
U.S., as a result of intense lobbying and compromise by the EU,
Japan has agreed to the terms of the Protocol.94 In addition, the
Russian delegation has made explicit overtures that the Protocol will be ratified by the Russian Federation.95 Even though
the Accords did not resolve every issue, in the words of one
commentator, “I prefer an imperfect agreement that is living to
a perfect agreement that doesn’t e xist.”96
III. THE PROTOCOL: THE U.S. P ERSPECTIVE
The U.S. and supporters of the Protocol are in agreement as
to the best means of combating global warming — in principle.
Both recognize the urgency of the problem, the need to take action on a global scale, and the benefits of using market mechanisms to accomplish real GHG reductions. Despite this seeming
harmony of opinion, U.S. concerns over issues like the exclusion
of developing countries and the economic impact of drastic GHG
reductions have guided U.S. policy and led to President Bush’s
declaration that the U.S. would not ratify the Protocol. For its
part, the Bush administration has countered with its own voluntary GHG emissions reduction program. Although this program falls far short of the Protocol’s guidelines, it demonstrates
that the U.S. has not completely turned a blind eye to the need
to reduce GHG emissions, and provides support for the belief
that the U.S. still has an important role to play in reducing
GHGs.

94. Japan
may
act
on
Pact
without
U.S.,
CNN,
at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/08/09/japan.environment/index
.htm (Aug. 9, 2001).
95. Climate treaty set to be ratified, CNN, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/
TECH/science/11/10/climate.talks/index.html (Nov. 10, 2001) (quoting Alexander Bedritsky, head of the Russian delegation at COP 7); Alastair Macdonald and Ed Stoddard, Russia, China say back Kyoto global warming pact,
REUTERS, available at http://www.enn.com/news/wire-stories/2002/
09/09042002/reu_48333.asp (Sept. 4, 2002).
96. Work
starts
on
Kyoto
Deal
details,
CNN,
at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/ 07/23/kyoto.talks/index.html (July
23, 2001) (quoting Oliver Deleuze, chief European Union negotiator at COP 7).
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A. U.S. Commitment to Reducing GHGs
Despite its refusal to participate in the Protocol, the U.S. has
repeatedly attempted to reduce the impact of global war ming.
During the 1990s, the Clinton Administration made strong
commitments toward both international and unilateral solutions to solving the global warming problem. Under Clinton’s
leadership, the U.S. signed the Protocol,97 secured more than $1
billion in funding for domestic renewable ene rgy and programs
to reduce emissions, and campaigned for further funding of
clean energy research and development.98 In addition, then
President William J. Clinton issued an Executive Order directing the federal government — the world’s largest energy consumer — to reduce gasoline use by 20% by 2005, and reduce
GHG emissions from federal buildings by 30% by 2010.99 These
efforts appear to have at least retarded the growth of U.S. emissions, as evidenced by a decoupling of emissions growth from
economic growth.100 In the 1990s, CO2 emissions grew by 12%
while the U.S. economy as a whole grew by 33%.101 This retardation and concerted government effort demonstrates the U.S.
recognition of the GHG problem and its willingness to exert its
power to be proactive in facilitating emission reductions.
President George W. Bush has also taken some strides, be
they small, toward curbing GHG emissions in the U.S. On February 14, 2002, the White House announced its “Clear Skies &
Global Climate Change Initiatives.”102 The President’s plan
calls for reduction in GHG “intensity”103 by 18% over the next
97. President Clinton signed the Protocol but it was never ratified by the
Senate. See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
98. Loy, supra note 16.
99. Exec. Order No. 13,123, 64 Fed. Reg. 30,851 (June 3, 1999). These
reduction figures represent percentages of 1990 levels of GHG emissions —
the exact same year the Protocol uses as its basis.
100. Loy, supra note 16. Meaning that growth in the economy does not entail a corollary growth in GHG emissions.
101. Id.
102. See Remarks Announcing the Clear Skies and Global Climate Change
Initiatives in Silver Spring, Maryland, 36 WEEKLY COMP . P RES. DOC. 232–236
(Feb. 18, 2002), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2002/02/20020214–5.html (President Bush’s speech to National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) on February 14, 2002) [hereinafter Clear
Skies Initiative].
103. The plan defines “intensity” as the ratio of GHG emissions to economic
output or, more specifically, number of metric tons of GHG emissions per mil-

File: Temple Base Macro final2.doc

232

Created on: 11/13/2002 2:10 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 4/28/2003 3:26 PM

[Vol. 28:1

ten years, which Bush declares is “comparable to the average
progress that nations participating in the Kyoto Protocol are
required to achieve.”104 Despite any challenges to the validity of
this claim, it is important to note that the President is using the
Protocol as the benchmark with which he is comparing his domestic GHG reduction plan. In other words, President Bush is
aspiring to meet the goals of the Protocol, even though he refuses to use its mechanisms.
In addition to his own affirmative actions to curb GHG production in the U.S., President Bush has also publicly declared
that “[t]he United States will not interfere with the plans of any
nation that chooses to ratify the Kyoto protocol.”105 The President’s statement underscores the fact that he is not adverse to
the goals of the Protocol, and by implication would probably not
attempt to thwart any positive impact the Protocol might have
on domestic U.S. GHG emissions.
Other American lawmakers have also demonstrated that they
are not adverse to GHG regulation, even regulation on an international scale.106 On the contrary, despite having opted out
of the Protocol, the U.S. government on the whole appears to be
amenable and arguably proactive in reducing the emission of
climate warming gases. Several bills have been circulating in
lion dollars of gross domestic product (“GDP”). Press Release, Office of the
Press Secretary, The White House, Fact Sheet: President Announces Clear
Skies & Global Climate Change Initiatives (Feb. 14, 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020214.html [hereinafter
Clear Skies Fact Sheet].
104. Id. This claim is very misleading. By defining GHG emissions reductions in terms of “intensity,” the U.S. is only reducing its growth in emissions
by 18% as opposed to the Protocol’s scheme, which requires a percentage reduction from 1990 levels. Thus, if the U.S. GDP grows by 30% over the next
10 years, the President’s 18% reduction will only be a reduction on that increase. This may slow the worsening of global warming, but will certainly
allow the overall number of metric tons of GHGs emitted in the U.S. to increase as fast as the economy can grow. Obviously, this is far less reaching
than the Protocol envisions.
105. Clear Skies Initiative, supra note 102.
106. A recent bill proposed in the Senate recognizes this proposition stating,
“a new long-term, technology-based, cost-effective, flexible, and global strategy
to ensure long-term energy security and manage the risk of climate change is
needed, and should be promoted by the United States in its domestic and international activities in this regard.” Climate Change Risk Management Act
of 2001, S. 1294, 107th Cong. § 2 (11) (2001) (bill was referred to the Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources).
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both houses of the U.S. Congress, accompanied by much debate,
proposing various systems to reduce GHG emissions.107 Such
bills have entailed the establishment of a mandatory GHG reporting system,108 and voluntary GHG trading system.109 Senators Chuck Hagel, Frank Murkowski, and Larry Craig have
proposed to spend $2 billion over ten years on new technology to
reduce GHG emissions, and other incentives to sell the technology to developing nations like China and India.110 In addition to
the proposed alternatives to the Protocol, many politicians, both
Democrats and Republicans, have rebuked President Bush from
withdrawing from the Protocol. For example, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee called on the White House to participate in international global warming negotiations and to bring
an alternative proposal to future COP meetings.111
In addition to national efforts to curb GHG emissions, state
and regional cooperation in the U.S. has led to valuable strides
toward domestic reductions. For example, the New England
Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers have adopted resolutions to help reduce GHG emissions within their own spheres
of influence.112 The non-binding agreements, which are strikingly similar to the terms of the Protocol, sends a “strong me s-

107. See Chris Baltimore, Republican Senators offer Kyoto treaty alternative,
REUTERS , at http://www.greenhousenet.org/news/august-2001/senatorsoffer
.html (Aug. 2, 2001). At minimum, these bipartisan proposals are a strong
acknowledgment from both American parties that global warming is a problem that must be addressed.
108. National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventory Act of 2002, H.R. 4611,
107th Cong. (2002).
109. Fuel Economy and Security Act of 2002, S. 1923, 107th Cong. (2002).
See Loy, supra note 16. Many of these recommendations found their way into
President Bush’s Clear Sky Initiatives. See e.g., Clear Skies Fact Sheet, supra
note 103 (noting the President’s commitment to improve the U.S. GHG registry “taking into account emerging domestic and international approaches”).
110. See International Energy Technology Deployment Program, S. 1294,
107th Cong., § 6 (2001); see also Baltimore, supra note 107.
111. S. 1401, 107th Cong. § 778(b)(3) (2001).
112. See, e.g., New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers,
Res. 25-9 (July 18, 2000) (resolution concerning global warming and its impacts on the environment). This conference represents a bipartisan group
that involves both American and Canadian officials, who discuss regional
issues. Michael Schaeffer, N.E. governors to turn up heat in fight against
global warming, MSNBC, available at http://www.msnbc.com/local/fddber
/m84359.asp (Aug. 26, 2001).
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sage about the importance of reducing emissions and using energy more efficiently.”113
Individual U.S. states are also providing a means to combat
GHG emissions. California, for example, recently passed comprehensive legislation providing a mandate for the reduction of
GHGs by empowering state administrative agencies to pass
rules and regulations governing GHG production.114 The legislation, among other things, continues a state GHG registry for
monitoring of emissions, which coincidentally is required under
the Protocol.115 In addition, it increases the number of miles per
gallon required of vehicles sold in California.116 These types of
measures demonstrate that despite President Bush’s refusal to
officially support the Protocol, there is a willingness to act on
the issue of global warming and accomplish the goals of the Protocol through means other than dejure federal compliance.
The U.S. has also signaled its willingness to reduce GHG
emissions and participate in a global solution through its me mbership in certain international organizations. For example,
the G8117 countries have made clear their intention to work both
domestically and internationally in order to combat GHG emi ssions.118 The G8 have formally recognized that GHG emissions

113. Schaeffer, supra note 112 (quoting Pamela Walsh, spokeswoman for
New Hamshire Governor Jeanne Shaheen).
114. 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 200 (A.B. 1493) (West), Vehicular emissions;
Greenhouse gases. California is a particularly important state to be leading
this charge given its importance as a legislative forerunner and considering it
is the 5th largest economy in the world. See id. § 1(b).
115. Id. § 2. Note the text of this legislation is an amendment to the California Health and Safety Code, relating to air quality.
116. See Press Release, Union of Concerned Scientists, California Sets New
Standard in Drive to Curb Global Warming (July 2, 2002), at
http://www.ucsusa.org/releases/07-02-02.html.
117. The G8 consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the
U.K. and the U.S., with the European Union participating with “observed
status.” The G8 was originally formed to deal with essentially macroeconomic
issues but has since expanded its scope to include issues such as terrorism,
drugs, and the environment. See G8 Summit Website, G8 Background, at
http://www.g8.gc.ca/aboutbackgrnd-e.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2002); G8
Summit Website, How the G8 Works, at http://www.g8.gc.ca/abouthow-e.asp
(last visited Oct. 28, 2002).
118. Although the G8 has made such declarations, they were unable to
reach any specific agreement on the Protocol. See G8 Environment Ministers
Communiqué,
Trieste,
Italy,
March
2–4,
2001,
available
at
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are altering the atmosphere in ways that are expected to affect
the climate.119 In addition, the G8 have recommitted themselves to take the lead in combating climate change and recognize that “a firm consensus for action on climate change is
needed.”120 Although the G8, and the U.S. by implication, have
fallen short of recommending the Protocol for ratification, the
tenor of the organization’s statements demonstrates a willingness to support the goals of the Protocol and act in a global
manner to bring about such change.
Judging from the myriad of proposals and overall interest in
the subject of global warming, it is apparent that although the
U.S. will not ratify the Protocol in its current form, the U.S. has
recognized its international obligation to curb its GHG emi ssions and its responsibility to work toward an international solution. The import of this finding is that it signifies that the
U.S. is not opposed to the goals of the Protocol, and arguably
will not attempt to inhibit any positive impact the Protocol may
have on the U.S.
B. No to Kyoto
Two camps emerged at the COP meetings: the EU, and a
partnership of states called the “Umbrella Group.”121 Although
these two groups had the same primary objective — to create a
climate protection regime — they came to a crossroads over the
issue of implementation. Their differences included squabbles
over allocation levels for certain states, enforcement procedures,
and level playing field arguments on the effects of the Protocol
on trade.122 While all of these issues were sticking points in the
negotiations, the most important, and ultimately decisive factors were their positions on whether developing countries
should be included in the Protocol and its impact on the economy.

http://www.esteri.it/g8/documentazione/docum02e.htm (last visited Oct. 28,
2002).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See supra note 91.
122. Id.
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1. The Developing Country Exception
As currently drafted, the Protocol does not include emissions
standards for developing countries. The U.S., together with
other members of the Umbrella Group, came to a loggerhead
with the EU over this issue. The EU, keeping to one of the tenants of the Protocol, argued that the largest share of historical
and current emissions originate in developed (industrialized)
countries, and therefore these countries should take the lead in
combating climate change and its adverse effects.123 It would be
fundamentally unfair to stunt the economic progress of industrializing nations by enforcing GHG emission requirements,
simply because those states where unable to industrialize before the Protocol.
The Umbrella Group, with the U.S. taking the lead, had a
much different perspective with respect to the inclusion of developing countries in the Protocol. They argued that emerging
markets like China, India, Mexico, South Korea, as well as another 130 nations not bound by the Protocol, are growing at an
explosive rate, such that the increase in emissions from these
states would quickly overshadow any reductions made by the
participating parties.124 For example, developing countries already produce 44% of global fossil fuel emissions and, owing
largely to geographic and economic conditions, are responsible
for a disproportionate share of deforestation and other land use
practices that have raised carbon concentrations.125 In addition,
it is estimated that 80% of new electric power generation projects will occur in these non-participating countries, creating
new sources of GHG that will not be subject to the restrictions
of the Protocol.126 As such, the Umbrella Group argued that
providing this large exception swallows the rule and severely

123. See Wolfgang Steinborn, Global Climate Change and GIS, at
http://www.geoplace.com/ge/2001/0111/0111ltr.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2002);
COP
5
Website,
Kyoto
Protocol
History,
at
http://cop5.unfccc.de/convkp/begconkp.html (last visited Aug 4, 2001).
124. Sen. Frank H. Murkowski (R-Alaska), The Kyoto Protocol is not the
Answer to Climate Change, 37 HARV . J. ON LEGIS. 345 (2000).
125. See Loy, supra note 16.
126. See id. Although such projects would not be directly subject to the
Protocol, they represent opportunities for the Contracting Parties to earn
additional units by financing the use of cleaner technology.
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limits the effectiveness of the Protocol so as to render it ineffective.127
The U.S. Senate has hammered this point home with the passage of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution (“Byrd-Hagel”), laying out its
position with regard to the developing country exception —
Whereas the exemption for Developing Country Parties is inconsistent with the need for global action on climate change
and is environmentally flawed; Whereas the Senate strongly
believes that the proposals under negotiation, because of the
disparity of treatment between Annex I Parties [Industrialized
Countries] and Developing Countries and the level of required
emission reductions, could result in serious harm to the
United States economy, including significant job loss, trade
disadvantages, increased energy and consumer costs, or any
combination thereof . . . .128

Byrd-Hagel made it explicit that the U.S. would not become a
party to any treaty that did not apply to developing countries.
This sentiment was given a resounding exclamation point with
the Senate passage of the resolution 95–0.129 President Bush
has reiterated the sentiments of the Senate but has been careful not to completely alienate the U.S. from the international
community. “America’s unwillingness to embrace a flawed
treaty should not be read by our friends and allies as any
abdication of responsibility. To
the
contrary,
[the]
administration is committed to a leadership role on the issue of
climate change.”130 Despite President Bush’s desire to play a
“leadership role,” it is clear that the U.S. government will not
ratify the Protocol in its existing form with the inclusion of the
developing country exception.
2. Economic Impact and the Effect of the California Power
Crisis
U.S. opposition to the Protocol, based largely on the developing country exception, has been further solidified by dome stic
power shortages and increases in the cost of power. The power
crisis that gripped California in 2001 again put energy on the
127. Id.
128. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
129. See 144 CONG. REC. S3240 (1998) (debate in the U.S. Senate one year
after the Bryd-Hagel Resolution).
130. President Bush Discusses Global Climate Change, supra note 20.
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national agenda.131 The rolling brown-outs and rapidly increasing energy prices created a sense of urgency in the energy sector
and led to the release of oil from the national reserves and debate over opening up the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in
Alaska for oil e xploration.132 It is against this backdrop that the
narrowly elected Bush Administration rejected the Protocol.133
The crisis had politicized power prices, which made the Protocol, and its possibly significant impact on energy prices, a politically dangerous subject.
Opponents of the Protocol argued that in light of the power
crisis, the considerable costs of implementing the Protocol simply could not be justified.134 As with any major piece of comprehensive regulation, quantifying the implementation costs has
been varied and difficult to assess. Some claim that the Protocol would require the U.S. to reduce its energy use to 40% below
the levels expected in 2010, the mid-range year of the first compliance period under the Protocol.135 In addition to reduced energy use, implementation of the Protocol could cause gasoline
prices to rise by 53% and electricity prices by 86% over the next
decade.136 The thought of such dizzying increases in the cost of
energy provides strong rhetoric against the Protocol when coupled with the political realities and repercussions of the 2001
California energy crisis.
3. Other Points of Contention
Besides the two main U.S. issues, there were several other
points of contention between the EU and the other Umbrella
131. Yahoo! provides an excellent compilation of articles and websites regarding the California energy crisis and energy deregulation. See Yahoo! New
Coverage,
Utility
Industry,
Deregulation
at
http://story.news.yahoo.com/fc?cid34&tmpl=fc&in=Business&cat=Utility_Indu
stry_Deregulation (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
132. See Sierra Club Website, Artic National Wildlife Refuge at
http://www.sierraclub.org/wildlands/arctic/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2002).
133. See Tony Eufinger, Hostile Environment: Europe Turns Up Heat on
Bush
Over
Global
Warming,
ABCNEWS.COM,
at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/politics/DailyNews/Kyoto010612.html
(last
visited Oct. 3, 2002)
134. See generally Murkowski, supra note 124.
135. Id. at 346.
136. Id. (citing Energy Information Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Impacts of
the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Energy Markets and Economic Activity (1998)).
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countries.137 Japan, for example, was against making penalties
for countries that fail to meet their Protocol targets legally
binding.138 The EU, in a move that clearly demonstrates the
importance of Japan’s participation in the Protocol,139 gave
ground by dropping the word “legally” from descriptions of the
binding force on countries that did not meet their Protocol targets.140 However, EU officials insisted that the targets would
still be “binding” on non-complying states.141
Another point of contention arose between the EU and nations with great areas of national forests like Canada and Russia. The Protocol provides that a state may obtain credits towards its GHG targets through the development and preservation of sinks that naturally take GHGs out of the atmosphere.142
There was much debate as to how these sinks should be quantified and the upper limits to which states could fulfill their Protocol obligations through such sources.143 In another demonstration of the Contracting Parties’ willingness to compromise
and save the Protocol, the EU made concessions and eliminated
its quest for lower caps on credits for forest and agricultural
land to which such sinks may be used to offset GHG emissions
targets.144
137. Although these issues have largely been resolved through compromises
made at COP 6 and 7.
Main points of Bonn deal, CNN, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/07/23/kyoto.points/ index.html (July
24, 2001) [hereinafter Main points of Bonn].
138. Main points of Bonn, supra note 137.
139. Japan is a crucial party for the Protocol to be ratified. Japan represents a large percentage of the world’s GHG emissions, and without U.S.
sponsorship, any arithmetic that does not include Japan will almost certainly
not add up to the 55% percent required for the Protocol to come into effect.
See supra note 88.
140. Main points of Bonn, supra note 137.
141. Id.
142. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, at art. 6.
143. The science of carbon sinks is not entirely clear and some evidence
tends to show that mature forests may not soak up the same levels of GHGs
as sinks created by reforestation, change in land use, or other improvements
in land management. Conflicting scientific evidence provides good fodder for
disagreement. See Can carbon sinks save our climate?, MSNBC, available at
http://stacks.msnbc.com/news/ 654274.asp (Nov. 7, 2001).
144. Main points of Bonn, supra note 137; see also Kyoto climate wrangling
continues, CNN, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/07/22/bonn.
kyoto/index.html (July 22, 2001); see also Marrakesh Accords – Vol. III (Decision 12/CP.7), supra note 79, at 64. (this provision in the Accord is the result
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Despite these other issues, it now appears likely that the majority of industrialized nations, excluding the U.S., will ratify
the Protocol, as detailed by the Accords.145 The extent to which
the Contracting Parties went in order to reach an agreement
signifies their commitment to the Protocol and their willingness
to work with the international community, even without U.S.
support. It is also important to note at this juncture that most
opponents of the Protocol, with some notable exceptions, did not
challenge the notion that some action should be taken to reduce
GHG emissions. This means that in theory the U.S. is not
against reduction schemes and could possibly be swayed into
action by the proven success of the Protocol or at least not attempt to thwart its success.
C. Will the U.S. Have a Change of Heart?
British Environment Minister Michael Meacher exclaimed,
“We have an agreement,” after emerging from the COP 7 in Morocco.146 It appears that, after a great deal of compromise, the
Conference has come to an agreement that will be ratified by
enough industrialized states, excluding the U.S., to come into
force.147 “The big question is how we bring the United States
into the biggest international effort against the greenhouse effect.”148 Despite the success of the parties at COP 7, this stat ement reflects the feeling that the U.S. still has a role to play in
the Protocol. It also signifies that the Contracting Parties are
still willing to negotiate with the U.S., should it reconsider its
stance on the scheme.
This interest to get the U.S. involved in international cooperation is not one sided. The U.S. has also made numerous indications that it has an international role to play in reducing
GHG emissions.149 The U.S. is not actively seeking to obstruct
the goals or implementation of the Protocol by any other

of the EC compromise and allows Russia to claim up to 33 megatons of carbon
per year, times five for forest management projects).
145. Climate Talks, supra note 15.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. (Olivier Deleuze, the head of the European delegation at COP 7,
raised this question)
149. See supra Part III.A.
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state.150 In fact, although the U.S. has stated that it will not
ratify the Protocol, it nevertheless sent a delegation to Marrakesh, which “weighed in heavily.”151 The U.S. Undersecretary
of State Paula Dobriansky, who led the U.S. delegation in Bonn,
stated that, “even in light of our position, this [attendance at
COP 7] demonstrates our commitment to dealing with global
climate change.”152 These explicit and implicit declarations
show that both the U.S. and the international community have
recognized the role the U.S. must play to be successful in reducing GHG emissions.
In the coming years, international pressure on the U.S. may
begin to intensify as opposition mounts to its continuing failure
to curb its GHG emissions. Despite its rhetorical adherence to
the principles of the Protocol, the U.S. has not been successful
in curbing its production of GHG emissions. In fact, according
to the U.S. Department of Energy, GHG emissions in the U.S.
have actually increased 3.1% from 1999 to 2000.153 As a signatory to the Protocol, the U.S. has an international obligation to
not purposefully defeat the intention of the Protocol.154 Judging
from these figures, the U.S. does not appear to be fulfilling its
duties, and without question, the world is taking notice.
Increasing pressure from abroad, U.S. willingness to engage
in GHG emission reduction schemes, and international recognition of the U.S. role in reducing GHG emissions are all factors
that may prove enough to eventually bring the U.S. itself into
the Protocol or have the Contracting Parties establish some sort
of a substantive relationship with the U.S. directly in combating
GHG emissions. However, any official relationship would be in
addition to the de facto relationship that may arise as a result
of widespread ratification of the Protocol.155 At minimum, these
factors set the stage where the U.S. is in agreement in princi150. CO2 Output Rose, supra note 18 (quoting Environmental Protection
Agency Administrator Christie Whitman). See also Work Starts on Kyoto Deal
details,
CNN,
at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/
07/23/kyoto.talks/index.html (July 23, 2001) [hereinafter Work Starts on
Kyoto].
151. Climate Talks, supra note 15.
152. Work Starts on Kyoto, supra note 150.
153. CO2 Output Rose, supra note 18.
154. Vienna Convention on Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
155. This “de facto” relationship is the subject of infra Part IV .
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ple, and probably will not take any affirmative action to hinder
the success of the Protocol — even if it results in decreasing
GHG emissions within the boarders of the U.S.
IV. GETTING THE U.S. IN THROUGH THE BACK DOOR
Thus far this Note has discussed the history and functionality
of the Protocol and the U.S.’s criticism of it. It has attempted to
demonstrate that the U.S. is not per se against international
efforts to reduce overall emissions of GHGs and will not actively
seek to counter the positive effects of the Protocol. Part IV analyzes the mechanics of how an international treaty, though not
ratified by the U.S., may nonetheless have an effect on American citizens. The answer lies in a combination of the phenomenon of globalization, the expansion of U.S. industry abroad, and
the specific nature of GHGs.
A. Globalization
Globalization, infused by technology, has brought people,
places, and information together on a scale unprecedented in
size or scope. The era of globalization began in 1989 with the
destruction of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany.156 The spy-counter-spy climate of the Cold War inhibited
international cooperation and stifled economic interdependence.
However, the relative safety that followed signaled an opportunity for greater international cooperation and trust, fueled by
peace and new technology.
Thomas Friedman described this period as a series of four interdependent revolutions or democratizations in four areas —
the democratization of technology, finance, information, and
decision-making.157 The democratization of technology was he ralded by the advent of personal computers, cellular phones, and
especially the Internet.158 These advancements allowed people
to communicate across international boundaries and extraordinary distances, providing the informational backbone for fur156. See THOMAS L. F RIEDMAN, T HE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE:
UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION (2000).
157. The following discussion is based on the summary of Friedman’s arguments in Daniel Gordon, Rosa Parks, The Lexus, The Olive Tree: Omitting
American Constitutionalism from a Theory of Globalization, 10 INT’L LEGAL
PERSP. 345, 350 (1998).
158. Id.
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ther developments in international interdependence. The democratization of finance, resulting from the combined pressure
of improved access to information and increased state regulation favorable to personal/individual and international investing, remade the financial industry.159 No longer was ownership
of bonds, common shares, IPOs, and derivative products limited
to large corporations, nor were these holdings limited to dome stic markets. In this manner, private individuals and corporations, through their investments, gained a larger place on the
international stage.160 The democratization of information was
both an integral part and a natural result of the progression of
the other “revolutions.”161 The development of technology allowed wide swaths of the world population access to information
formerly unavailable to private individuals.162 State regulation
was altered in such a way as to require investment entities to
use these technological developments to publish detailed information via the new methods.163 As a result, pertinent information on all conceivable topics, including investment information,
became available quickly and internationally.
Finally, the democratization of decision-making refers to the
decentralization of power and information.164 With the increased complexities of their citizenry,165 governments have responded by decentralizing authority and delegating power to
the likes of administrative agencies, committees, and other specialized bodies. This furthered globalization by allowing for
greater flexibility and fluidity in the decision-making process.166
Friedman argued that these four revolutions “crumbled walls
and controls between societies and economies throughout the
world creating a wide-open economic and social plain that extended around the world.”167
159. Id. at 351.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 351.
163. Gordon, supra note 157, at 351.
164. Id. at 351–52.
165. The phrase “complexity of citizenry” means that through the democratizations already discussed, private individuals and corporations have become
both more informed and complex, and require additional functions from their
governments. See id. at 352.
166. Id. at 352.
167. Id.
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These advances in technology, finance, information, and decision-making have created an international environment where
economies have become intertwined and interdependent:
The globalisation of economic activity [democratization of finance] has led to massive increases in both trade flows and
cross-border investments. Lower tariffs and the reduction of
other barriers to trade [democratization of dec ision-making],
combined with the pursuit of new customers and limited
growth prospects in home markets, has pr ovided a powerful
impetus for international expansion in many industries . . .
[and an] urgent need for scale and scope efficiencies. 168

As the quote above implies, cross-boarder deals and overall
increase in trade between states has placed new international
actors in global comp etition across distances and boarders. The
simple fact that these entities are increasingly interacting in
foreign jurisdictions necessarily entails that they are more and
more being subject to the laws and regulations of these jurisdictions. This has created an entire body of international law
called competition law, whereby jurisdictions are “competing” to
create workable and attractive legal frameworks for transacting
international business, but at the same time maintaining their
state’s sovereignty and right to regulate those businesses operating within its territory.169 Suffice it to say, globalization170
has increased the level of interdependency of states and significantly increased the amount of contact entities transacting
business have with foreign regulation.
B. U.S. Corporations Abroad
U.S. based corporations, reacting to the phenomenon of globalization, have become increasingly multinational and more
dependent on foreign markets not only as a source of sales, but

168. J. WILLIAM ROWLEY & A. NEIL CAMPBELL, INT’L BAR ASS’N, POLICY
DIRECTIONS FOR GLOBAL M ERGER REVIEW 9 (London 1999).
169. Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies, 50 AM . J. COMP. L. 97, 103–04 (2002).
170. This Note will hereinafter use the term “globalization” to refer to the
increased interdependence of states, brought about largely as a result of the
evidence put forth by Friedman. See supra note 156.
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for production,171 giving rise to large multinational corporations.172 These multinationals create affiliates in foreign jurisdictions173 that allow (in this case) the American parent to bring
together, in closer temporal proximity, the means of production
and the markets that are being served.174 In this way, American companies’ significant capital expenditures have enabled
them to extend their reach into numerous states and in the
process, made themselves subject to the jurisdiction of these
foreign states.
The inroads made into foreign states by U.S. multinational
corporations are particularly prevalent in the largest GHG producing sector — manufacturing. Manufacturing represents a
substantial percentage of the total investment by U.S. entities
in foreign jurisdictions. In the year 2000, the total cash outflow
from the U.S. for manufacturing was about $44 billion, which
represents almost 31% of the total cash outflow for all industries.175 The priority that American capital is placing on manufacturing in foreign markets demonstrates that American entities are financing GHG production abroad.
This slant towards the internationalization of American
manufacturing can be seen in the numerous examples of large
American companies operating in foreign jurisdictions. For example, Dow Chemical Inc. serves many local markets by replicating its U.S. production facilities in other countries.176 Similarly, Ford Motor Co. and General Motors Inc. have production
171. See Gordon H. Hanson et al., Expansion Strategies of U.S. Multinational Firms, National Bureau of Economic Research (“NBER”) (Apr. 2001),
available at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/papers/hms1.pdf.
172. A firm becomes multinational when it establishes in two or more countries business enterprises in which it exercises some minimum level of ownership control. Hanson, supra note 171. For purposes of this section, this Note
defines terms according to their use in the Hanson article.
173. A foreign affiliate is a foreign business enterprise in which there is U.S.
direct investment. The U.S. legal entity (e.g. business or individual) must
have at least a 10% equity stake. A majority-owned affiliate is a foreign business enterprise in which the U.S. entity has at least a 51% equity stake. Id.
at 2.
174. Id.
175. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Direct
Investment Abroad: Detail for Historical-Cost Position and Related Capital
and Income Flows 2000, Table 17, SCB (Sept. 2001), available at
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/ARTICLES/2001/09september/0901USDIA2K.pdf.
176. Hanson, supra note 171, at 1.

File: Temple Base Macro final2.doc

246

Created on: 11/13/2002 2:10 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 4/28/2003 3:26 PM

[Vol. 28:1

facilities in Brazil and Thailand where they not only build vehicles for local markets but for the broader regional markets of
South America and Southeast Asia.177 Intel Corp. does not reproduce its U.S. plant model but nonetheless produces its global
semiconductor product abroad through a fragmented system
with its wafer-fabrication plants in Ireland and Israel, and microchip-assembly plants in Costa Rica and the Philippines.178
These multinationals are no longer the exception but the rule.
The number of American affiliated companies in foreign jurisdictions has remained high over the last decade. In 1998, for
example, American parent companies had 533 manufacturing
affiliates in the United Kingdom alone, with an additional 323
in Germany.179 Canada also had an overwhelming 533 American manufacturing affiliates within its borders.180 The crucial
element is that all of these countries either have or will probably ratify the Protocol over the next year and will be responsible
for lowering GHG emissions in their domestic jurisdictions,
which apply to both domestic corporations and foreign affiliates
alike. Therefore, a large number of American affiliates181 may
be dramatically affected by the Protocol’s implementation. In
this small sampling of three states, the Protocol will have an
impact on almost 1,400 U.S. manufacturing affiliates physically
located in Protocol-supporting states. These comp anies and

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Hanson, supra note 171, at 47.
180. Id.
181. Presumably this theory will also work in the reverse with foreign multinationals with affiliates and investments in the U.S. American multinationals are not the only entities that have significant investments in foreign
jurisdictions. In 1999, more than half of the $330 billion in foreign investment
in U.S. manufacturing came from the environmental friendly continent of
Europe. These multinationals will already be under pressure from their domestic governments as a result of the Protocol, and similar to the American
companies, will try to reduce emissions wherever it is most cost effect,
whether it be in the U.S. or otherwise. See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of
Economic Analysis, Direct Investment Positions for 1999: Country and Industry
Detail,
Table
4.1,
SCB
(July
2000),
available
at
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/articles/internat/fdinvest/2000/0700dip.pdf (note
that the figures are based on a historical-cost basis).
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their U.S. parents will be forced to confront the global warming
issue and deal with it on a mandated international scale.182
C. GHGs Without Borders
The preceding sections have established that through the
forces of globalization, a number of large, multinational, U.S.
firms with foreign affiliates have developed. It is clear that
these affiliates will be subject to jurisdictions that have or will
ratify the Protocol, however, it remains to be seen how precisely
this will affect the U.S. parent corporation domestically. The
answer lies in the nature of GHGs and GHG trading systems.
One of the basic premises of the Protocol is that with regard
to GHG emissions, there is no difference between reducing
emissions in one part of the world or another.183 This means
that a unit that is reduced in the U.S. is equally equivalent to a
unit reduced in Europe. Therefore, the market will naturally
eliminate the most wasteful productions of GHG emissions,
wherever they exist in the world.184 If an American affiliate is
required to substantially reduce its GHG emissions in a foreign
jurisdiction, it will either be forced to purchase additional units,
fund projects to acquire ERUs, decrease its own production, or
increase its own allotment by reducing emissions elsewhere in
the parent corporation — including the parent’s state of domicile, in this case the U.S. “Whether or not the United States
signs Kyoto [the Protocol], multinationals know they’ll eventually have to deal with emissions caps in at least some of their
territories.”185
Therefore, these U.S. multinationals have already begun to
position themselves to gain valuable experience in carbon trading and store up units while they are still relatively cheap.186
182. The mechanism for how affiliate liability for GHG emissions will affect
the American parent corporation will be discussed more fully in the following
section. See infra Part IV .C.
183. This is the reason that the Protocol allows for trading in GHG units
and provides for credits for carbon sequestration activities like aforestation
and reforestation within the boarders of other states. See Kyoto Protocol,
supra note 7, at arts. 6, 12, and 17.
184. See discussion on market mechanisms supra Part II.B.
185. Foroohar, supra note 13 (quoting Economist Richard Sandor, who currently brokers GHG trades through his company, Environmental Financial
Products).
186. Foroohar, supra note 13.
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The global energy broker Natsource estimates that already 55
million tons of GHGs have been traded since 1996 and that the
market could expand to $200 billion within the next few
years.187 These factors have led multinationals to take preemptive measures such as investing in carbon sinks, and engaging
in GHG trading, all of which could translate to domestic U.S.
reductions188 of GHG emissions or American financing of reductions abroad.189
For example, in May 2001, U.S. environmental nonprofit organization called the Nature Conservancy persuaded General
Motors Inc. (“GM”) to give $10 million for rebuilding a Brazilian
rain forest devastated by water buffalo ranching.190 GM’s
money went toward replanting trees and preserving what remains of the forest.191 Under the Protocol, the corporation could
eventually receive credits for the carbon dioxide that the new
forest will absorb over the next 40 years.192 GM might then be
able to use those credits to offset some of its own emissions, allowing it to meet targets for reducing GHG emission not just in
the U.S., but also in any of its foreign affiliates directly impacted by the Protocol.193
Another attempt at preemptive action in the U.S. involves
Native American tribal forestlands in Montana. In the spring
of 2001, a London company called Sustainable Forestry Management gave the Salish and Kootenai tribes of Montana,
$50,000 to reforest 250 acres devastated by fire.194 In exchange,
the company received the rights to an estimated 47,972 tons of
carbon dioxide that the trees would absorb over the course of 80
years.195 If their estimates are correct, a ton of GHG emissions
may someday be worth $70 or more, meaning that the tribes’
deal could earn the corporation more than $3 million.196

187. Id.
188. The term “reduction” is being used to include carbon sequestration
projects that remove carbon from the air and count towards Protocol goals.
189. Foroohar, supra note 13.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Foroohar, supra note 13.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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In addition to these external investments in carbon sinks,
U.S. multinationals are already beginning to take part in trading schemes. For example, there are plans to launch an American GHG trading platform called the Chicago Climate Exchange.197 Multinationals like British Petroleum (“BP”), Du
Pont and Ford are participating in the design phase.198 BP has
been particularly forward looking.199 It has already implemented an internal system that sets company wide limits, and
have divisions trade units between themselves.200 So far, the
system has traded 5 million tons of emissions among its own
divisions and helped the company meet its own emissionsreduction targets while maintaining growth.201 One recent
trade involved a petroleum division in the Gulf of Mexico, which
needed more emissions credits to keep up with demand. It
bought them from a slower-growing U.S. chemical division,
which then used that money to purchase a new, more energyefficient furnace.202 In effect, the transaction reduced emissions
on both sides of the deal and increased overall productivity.
The main point is that the impact of the Protocol can already
be felt in the U.S, and the Protocol has not even taken effect.
Whether it is in the form of Montana carbon sequestration projects or international carbon trading, the world has become a
smaller place and the U.S. can and will be impacted by widespread adoption of the Protocol, even though they choose not to
legally participate.
V. CONCLUSION
The refusal of the U.S. to ratify the Protocol does not prohibit
it from having a significant impact on domestic GHG emissions.
Globalization, market mechanisms of the Protocol, and increased interdependence of the world’s markets prevent the
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Although BP is not a U.S. multinational, its American colleagues are
also well prepared for dealing with these issues. This is especially true because many American multinationals already participate in a successful pollution trading scheme for acid rain producing gases. Therefore, these companies possess many of the competencies that will be required. See Yelin-Kefer,
supra note 26, at 221.
200. Foroohar, supra note 13.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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unilateral acts of the U.S. from thwarting the intentions of the
Protocol. Nonetheless, the U.S. is demonstrably progressive in
its efforts to curb its emissions, and appears to have already
contemplated its role in international GHG reducing schemes
such as the Protocol, as noted by Senator John McCain:
Given the developing international market, it also makes
sense to ensure that what we do domestically can be integrated and recognized on the international level. Ultimately,
we need to make sure that the emissions reductions our companies, our farmers, and our foresters produce are fully recognized and fully tradable in the emer ging global greenhouse
gas marketplace. 203

Hopefully, as indicated by the Senator’s quote, the U.S. is
preparing for the role it must play in reducing GHG emissions.
However, by implementing the Protocol, the international
community is demonstrating its resolve to act without U.S. participation and its willingness to take the lead in creating the
mechanisms within which global warming will be combated in
the future.
John F. Temple∗

203. 147 CONG. REC. S8894 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2001) (statement of Sen.
McCain).
∗ The author would like to dedicate this Note to his parents John and
Mary Temple and thank them for their support and encouragement.

